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ABSTRACT  
 
In this paper we study policy reactions to the crisis across the Atlantic, with specific emphasis on its 
Eastern side. We want to explain the different attitude of European policymakers vis-à-vis their USA 
homologues and to this end we choose the perspective of the historical roots of European monetary 
union (EMU) institutions. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
As is well known, the current crisis was born in the USA in 2007 but soon spread to 
Europe. Its (proximate) roots were in the accumulation of private debt. In 2009 its pace 
began slowing down in the USA as an effect of public intervention while accelerating in 
Europe as a public debt crisis emerged here on the top of the private debt one and 
improper policies were adopted to face them.  
In this paper we study policy reactions to the crisis across the Atlantic, with specific 
emphasis on its Eastern side. We want to explain the different attitude of European 
policymakers vis-à-vis their USA homologues and to this end we choose the 
perspective of the historical roots of European monetary union (EMU) institutions.  
In the USA both fiscal and monetary policy were active in counteracting recessionary 
impulses, with a clear Keynesian imprint. Monetary policy was also innovative, as it 
devised various types of unconventional measures that added to the traditional ones. 
Differently from policies in Washington, in the EMU, only the Frankfurt pole, i.e. 
monetary policy, was actively expansionary, even if with some hesitation, and to some 
extent innovative. Fiscal policy not only did not offer any expansionary impulse, but 
acted in the opposite direction.  
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 This different reaction is consistent with the foundations of European institutions, 
which found their roots both in a number of de facto circumstances, but drew 
theoretical support in the theories prevailing at the time. However, they seem to be no 
longer justified on these terms, i.e. with respect to current theories, which have 
countered almost all the conclusions of theories that were asserted by the end of the 
Sixties and widely applied in Anglo-Saxon countries in the Eighties and Continental 
Europe in the Nineties. This raises the issue whether there are different explanations 
for the continuation of such out-dated policies, in terms, e.g., of the opposing interests 
of the member states and their relative bargaining power.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section briefly describes the 
evolution of the crisis and policy responses in Washington and Frankfurt. Section 3 
deals with the impact of the EMU institutional architecture on the dynamics of the crisis 
with an implicit comparison with that of the USA. Section 4 sketches the historical roots 
of EMU institutions and the different interests and targets pursued by the participating 
countries. In section 5 we study the analytical foundations of the main building blocks 
of EMU institutions both at the time they were devised and in the light of current 
economic thought. In section 6 we suggest some possible explanations of the 
hysteresis shown by European institutions and policies and try to answer the issue 
why European policymakers seem to be still slaves of economic theories fashionable 
in the Seventies. Section 7 concludes. 
 
 
2. EXIT POLICIES IN WASHINGTON AND FRANKFURT   
 
2.1. The evolution of the crisis in the USA and Europe 
 
The financial turmoil initiated in 2007 in the USA and turned into a deep crisis in terms 
of the main macroeconomic indicators. The financial problems soon hit Europe too and 
began to cause recession also here. In 2009 the GDP went down by 2.6 per cent in 
the USA and by 4.4 per cent in the Euro-area. In 2010, on the top of the private debt 
problem – and to a large extent as an outcome of public policy measures enacted to 
cope with it – a public debt issue arose in Europe. Sovereign debts in some countries 
– the so-called PIIGS countries, i.e., Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain – were 
hit by speculation and spreads between the interest rate paid on them and that of 
German Bunds soared to unsustainable levels.  
 
 
2.2. Policies in Washington 
 
Expansionary monetary policy was soon enacted in the USA. It first tended to support 
ailing financial institutions and then to facilitate economic recovery. To this end various 
rounds of unconventional measures have been undertaken – ‘Quantitative easing’ 
(QE) 1 to 3.  
The fiscal stance too has always been expansionary. Conspicuous discretionary 
measures were taken, beginning with G. W. Bush TARP (implying a $700 bn. 
 purchasing of nonperforming financial assets from the balance sheet of private banks, 
infusion of funds into GM, Citigroup and AIG), continuing with President Obama’s 
ARRA in 2009, which led to an additional expenditure (and tax cuts and transfers) of 
$787 bn. It is true that part of the discretionary impulse could be simply explained by a 
structural feature such as the paucity of automatic stabilizers in that country (Dolls et 
al., 2012b). However, it testifies the will of the American administration to counter the 
recession, even at the cost of public debt accumulation. A struggle has then emerged 
towards the end of 2012 between the Obama administration and the opposition as to 
the way to cope with the ‘fiscal cliff’. A debt ceiling has limited the possibility of 
prolonging the fiscal expansionary stance and the discretionary impulse will be 
(moderately) negative in next years. As a consequence of policy intervention GDP in 
the USA has risen at an average rate of 2.3 per cent since 2009. 
 
 
2.3. Policies in Frankfurt 
 
Practically all the Euro-area countries, Germany included, have responded to the crisis 
with a moderately expansionary fiscal stance, up to 2010. This has been followed by a 
contractionary orientation after the emergence of a public debt issue. A strengthening 
of the Stability and growth pact (SGP) has then been decided.
1
 This has failed to 
pursue its claimed target, i.e. a fall in deficit/GDP and debt/GDP ratios in order to tame 
the speculation. In fact, the recession has lowered the denominator of these ratios and 
conjured up the spectrum of a future crisis of confidence. After a drop by 4.4 per cent 
in 2009 the Euro-area GDP expanded only by 2 per cent in 2010 and 1.4 per cent in 
2011, to fall again by .6 per cent last year.
2
 
Monetary policy response had been expansionary until April 2011. The European 
Central Bank has used 12-month and 36-month long term refinancing operations 
(LTRO) (a form of quantitative easing) since 2009. These operations have continued in 
2011 and 2012. In addition, the ECB instituted a Securities Markets Programme 
(SMP),
3
 by which it purchased bonds issued by the countries under speculative attack 
                                                 
1 For an inquiry on the size of both automatic stabilizers effects and the discretionary fiscal stance of 
European countries see Dolls et al. (2012a). As said, an inverse relationship between the two components of 
fiscal policy is found by Dolls et al. (2012b). In March 2011 the Pact was toughened, requiring drastic action to 
reduce the debt/GDP ratio and instituting ex ante surveillance of national budgets and in December 2011 the 
fiscal compact was agreed on.  
2 Indeed, the previous growth record of Euro-area countries is not much better, as compared not only with 
the United States but also with other EU countries such as Denmark, Sweden and the UK. This low growth, in 
our view, was largely due to the deflationary bias of the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact, 
as well as the lack of common industrial and growth policies. 
3 According to the ECB “the design and implementation of such measures remains focused on the ECB's 
primary objective”, namely price stability. Ostensibly they will only “remove the major roadblocks” to the 
effectiveness of standard policies and “by their nature are temporary to the extent that they have to be 
strictly commensurate to the degree of dysfunctionality of markets that is hampering the transmission 
mechanism. The central bank must guard against the danger that the necessary measures in a crisis period 
would evolve into a dependency as conditions normalize” (Trichet, 2010; ECB, 2010a). The main 
 to the tune of several hundred billion euros
4
. In this sense European monetary policy 
shared some features with the Federal Reserve's policy of quantitative easing, but we 
show later that the analogy is only apparent.  
After April 2011, despite the feebleness of the economic recovery in that year, the 
ECB prematurely initiated an exit strategy and insisted on this course for some 
months. Finally, in November this stance was abandoned and substituted by an 
expansionary one.
5
 In July–September 2012 the ECB decided to undertake Outright 
Monetary Transactions in secondary markets to support sovereign bonds’ demand in 
the euro area. These are not true unconventional monetary policy measures similar to 
the American or British-style QE, not only because they are limited to a subset of 
European countries (those having an ‘appropriate’ EFSF/ESM programme designed to 
reduce the deficit and debt/GDP ratios)
6
, whereas QE in the US and UK has targeted 
those countries' entire debt, but also because the impact of the interventions should be 
sterilised in order to re-absorb the liquidity injected. Even if the immediate targets of 
the ECB interventions resemble those of the Federal Reserve, i.e. driving down the 
interest rate on government bonds, the final objectives differ. For the Fed the 
fundamental aim is to lower long-term interest rates so as to foster private investment, 
whereas the ECB is basically seeking to make up for the EMU's lack of consistent and 
credible institutional architecture and, ultimately, to ensure the survival of the euro, 
which has emerged in the course of the crisis as the true issue at stake. 
Notwithstanding this profound difference, until now (May 2013), OMT have been able 
to stop the speculative component of spreads between PIIG countries and the German 
Bund. Had the ECB decided to commit earlier to unlimited support of sovereign debt, 
the crisis in the Eurozone might have followed a different course
7
. 
 
 
2.4. Why so much difference? 
 
As we have seen, in the USA steady expansionary policies were adopted with no 
hesitation. In the EMU only monetary policy has been – all in all – expansionary, but 
premature exit policies have been adopted for a certain time, whereas fiscal policy has 
always been contractionary since 2010. The outcomes in macroeconomic terms are 
clearly in favour of the USA. 
                                                                                                                                        
preoccupation of the ECB has been to ensure that the Programme can avoid having an impact on monetary 
conditions. Such an impact has been repeatedly denied, even if some analysts doubt that (Henderson Global 
Investors, 2010).  
4 The Programme involved buying a little more than €200 billion bonds. After it had been terminated in 
September 2012, bonds held by the ECB were still €218 billion at the end of February, 2013. 
5 The ECB increased the main refinancing operations rate by a quarter of a point twice in April and July 2011 
to lower it in four legs, in November, December 2011, July 2012 and May 2013. 
6 A European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) was first established in 2010, that was later substituted by a 
European Stability Mechanism (ESM), to begin operating in 2013. 
7 On this see also De Grauwe and Ji (2013a). 
 Striking the proper balance between restoring normality and avoiding protracted 
depression is the crux of the matter of exit policies. This has proved to be all the 
harder in a currency union like the EMU, which is not a federal state and has no 
common fiscal policy. In the current institutional setting the exit strategies adopted 
within the EMU derive from a bias towards being premature and so tend to aggravate 
the risk of prolonged depression. The bias stems from the fact that some deficiencies 
of the institutional architecture have prevailed and impatience and the pressure of 
markets have imposed premature adoption of exit strategies.  
 
 
3. THE INSTITUTIONAL ARCHITECTURE AND THE DYNAMICS OF THE CRISIS IN THE EMU 
8
   
 
3.1. Introduction  
 
The Euro-area crisis is usually described as characterized by the dynamics of the 
public debt in specific countries, in particular the PIIGS countries. This characterization 
raises a number of questions. First, how did this dynamics link to that of private debt, 
which was at the origin of the crisis? Then, to what extent was the piling up of public 
debt the outcome of improper policy conduct by the national policymakers of PIIGS 
countries and of an inappropriate EMU institutional setting? Finally, was there bad 
management of the crisis by European policymakers?  
In the next subsection we explain how the public debt crisis emerged to a large 
extent as a consequence of a private debt crisis nourished by the EMU institutions. In 
subsection 3.3 we show how these institutions helped the public debt crisis precipitate 
into a depression. In the last subsection we point to the main shortcomings of the EMU 
institutions vis-à-vis those of USA. 
 
 
3.2. The trend in private debt  
 
The accumulation of private debt in some countries (not only the PIIGS) was built into 
the way the Euro-area institutions were (and are) shaped, which caused 
macroeconomic imbalances to arise. In fact, differences in real interest rates derive 
from virtually equal nominal rates throughout the area but different inflation rates
9
. 
Such differences tended to stimulate borrowing and speculative operations in the real 
estate and stock markets in the less advanced member states (De Grauwe, 2010a). 
                                                 
8 This section partly draws on Acocella (2011). 
9 The macroeconomic imbalances within the Euro-area depend on a number of circumstances. Here, we 
concentrate on the differing wage and price trends. These, in turn, are to some extent tied to untackled 
structural factors, as underlined by Balassa (1964) and Samuelson (1964). Moreover, the degree of 
competition in labour and goods markets is different as an effect of the historical, structural and policy factors 
that influence price competition and wage bargaining. There is in fact no simple way of explaining why the 
rate of increase in wages declined in Germany and Austria after the advent of EMU and rose in other 
countries, creating new inflation differentials or widening existing ones. 
 Expectations of high real growth convinced people of the sustainability of debt (EEAG, 
2011).
10
 Free capital movements and a common monetary policy that was 
expansionary until 2006 actually fuelled this process. Again, absence of any common 
financial supervisor, regulator or rescue body made it possible for the bubble to grow 
and burst as soon as the financial crisis imported from the USA erupted. To save 
financial intermediaries required the intervention of national governments and an 
increase in public deficits, thus threatening the whole European financial system, as 
we will see in the next subsection.  
Contrary to the conclusions of Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002),
11
 the Union should 
not have adopted a position of benign neglect with respect to the impact on current 
account imbalances, as these are a potential source of problems and disruption. This 
attitude faced real difficulties. For one thing, imbalances could not be properly dealt 
with under the Euro-area's institutional arrangements (see in particular De Grauwe, 
2009 and Harashima, 2011). Sticking to these, i.e., with no innovation introduced in the 
institutional architecture of EMU, each country should undertake policies to resolve the 
imbalances on its own, and the deflationary effects could snowball. In fact, different 
countries tried to cope in different ways. Some took a contractionary budget stance; 
others did not, preferring higher employment in the short run, and instead enacted 
labour market reform to remedy the deterioration in the real exchange rate. Labour 
market flexibility has thus increased substantially in a number of EMU countries (see, 
e.g., Damiani et al., 2011). Contrary to the opinion of some authors (Zemanek et al., 
2010, and references therein), this has not significantly reduced inflation differentials, 
first of all because Germany reacted by further trimming wage increases (De Grauwe, 
2009). Moreover, the reforms were not really effective when the crisis erupted; in some 
countries (such as Spain) they had created an army of temporary workers that 
compounded the recession. Some countries, such as Greece, neither shrank their 
budget nor enacted labour market reform in the last decade,
12
 which might help to 
explain the strength of the tensions accumulated. 
 
 
3.3. The public debt  
 
Unlike the private sector debt, before the crisis the public debt had been reduced in all 
the Euro-area countries except Germany and Portugal only. In the area as a whole it 
fell from 69 per cent of GDP in 2000 to 66 per cent in 2007 (Eurostat, 2011). As to the 
peripheral countries, their past histories are quite varied.
13
 So there is little basis for 
                                                 
10 See Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002) on the sustainability of current account deficits. 
11 For a recent reappraisal of the relevance of the issue, see Giavazzi and Spaventa (2010). 
12 On the contrary, the proportion of temporary jobs actually decreased from 1999 to 2006 (see 
Lampousaki, 2008). 
13 Spain had a low debt/GDP ratio before EMU and halved it to 36 per cent in 2007. After 1999 Portugal ran 
deficits larger than those of Germany and France (3.6 per cent against 2.1 and 2.6 per cent, respectively, in 
1999-2007), but smaller than those of a number of other EMU countries. As for Ireland, it had a high debt 
ratio until 1985 but succeeded in reducing it to a record low of 25 per cent in 2007 thanks to rapid GDP 
 the analysis of the EEAG (2011) according to which these countries were marked by 
excessive public spending and borrowing. In practice, the only such country was 
Greece. And, all in all, there was no sign of significant public debt tensions before the 
crisis, with the exception of Greece, whose difficulties were disclosed in the course of 
the crisis but actually stemmed from previous conduct. The EEAG report is thus 
mistaken in attributing the crisis to moral hazard,
14
 i.e. a lax attitude on the part of the 
PIIGS governments owing to the expectation of being bailed out by other European 
countries.
15  
When it comes to the management of the crisis, matters stand somewhat differently. 
Initially, many countries had to expand their budget deficits greatly to cope with the 
financial crisis
16
. But in the process, the size of the deficit/GDP ratio depended on the 
governments' response, specifically on the deflationary fiscal policies initiated in 2010 
by all the EMU countries as each government sought to ward off insolvency, which 
tended to contain the numerator of that ratio, but eventually reduced the denominator 
too. Tensions within the EMU exploded almost by chance – in the case of Greece, 
when the new government disclosed its predecessor's misconduct – or as a direct 
consequence of the crisis and the need for government intervention, as in Ireland. 
Expectations of insolvency then arose. 
Some analysts (EEAG, 2011, for one) hold that the shocks would have been avoided 
simply by enacting a stiffer SGP and a credible no-bailout clause. However, this would 
not have worked with Greece, which could still have violated it, not reporting the true 
state of its public finances. In the case of Ireland, this would simply have made it 
harder to rescue the banks. And the measures proposed would have had an extra 
deflationary effect, causing additional difficulties for other countries. In fact, the burden 
of the bank rescue was aggravated by the bad design of the euro area's first bailout 
fund, the European Financial Stability Facility, which charged high interest rates and 
sent a negative signal (of significant default risk) to the markets (De Grauwe, 2011). 
Finally, making the SGP more rigid would have aggravated the deflationary effects. 
 
 
3.4. The role of institutions 
 
                                                                                                                                        
growth. Greece, then, is the only case of high and rising debt since the formation of the EMU. Italy also 
lowered the debt/GDP ratio until 2008, but it then turned sharply upwards as an effect of the crisis. The poor 
prospects for reasonably high growth in the medium run then fuelled speculation. 
14 The underlying idea is in Sinn (2010). 
15 According to De Grauwe (2011) the thesis that the crisis was ultimately determined by moral hazard at 
banks is also untenable. In fact, it is hard to imagine that the root cause of excessive risk-taking by private 
banks was some expectation of being bailed out by the governments, in Europe or elsewhere. 
16 Generally speaking, an increase in private debt should trigger a build-up in government debt, according to 
the debt deflation dynamics analyzed by Fisher (1933) and Minsky (1982). As De Grauwe (2010b: 3) notes, this 
occurs through two channels: first, governments relieve banks of their debt; and second, the public deficit 
increases by reason of automatic stabilizers and Keynesian discretionary policies. 
 In this subsection we point out the specific EMU institutional features that explain the 
different steps of the EMU crisis, having an eye to USA institutions. 
Generally speaking and apart from fiscal policy, absence or weakness of a number 
of common institutions in the EMU didn’t help prevent the private debt crisis to arise. 
We refer to common policies in fields such as financial regulation, wage policy, 
regional and industrial policy
17
. As seen in the previous sub-sections, the accumulation 
of private debt by some EMU countries derived from structural imbalances. Failing an 
adequately high labour mobility
18
, imbalances should have been prevented by an 
appropriate wage policy, under the form of price and incomes policy, and/or by a 
proper regional and industrial policy. The former could have set a dynamics of wages 
related to that of productivity and an appropriate price regulation. The latter should 
have pointed to the growth of ‘peripheral’ economies, to an extent much higher than 
the actual one, thus requiring a more significant EU budget. Thus absence of a 
common and active government in the monetary union explains current account 
deficits, speculative bubbles and the accumulation of private debt in PIIGS countries.  
The SGP – i.e., again, a passive rather than active fiscal policy – contributed too to 
the accumulation of public debt in most PIIGS countries and the ensuing speculative 
operations that aggravated it. A limited but timely intervention by a federal government 
such as the USA one would have avoided precipitating the financial position of those 
countries. Moreover, the conservative nature of the ECB contributed to the late and 
insufficient rescue interventions. Operating in the primary market of government bonds 
would have been more effective for the ECB not only in limiting speculative operations 
but also in promoting the real economy recovery.
19
 Had a federal government and a 
non-conservative central bank been in place, the Greek and Irish shocks might have 
occurred, but they could have been smoothly absorbed, with no domino effect. 
In addition to formal institutions and specific policies we should finally mention the 
value judgments underlying them. Relying on punishment by markets in order to 
reduce moral hazard has been at the heart of the interventions to cope with the public 
debt crisis and the route actually followed for fixing EMU institutions, in particular for 
stiffening the mechanism of the SGP and devising the bailout mechanism. This not 
only is a partial and highly expensive remedy to the crisis, but can even be a further 
factor of systemic crisis: in fact, bondholders will run for cover every time they fear the 
likelihood of a default, with the possibility of creating a self-fulfilling mechanism of 
crisis. A system of stick and carrot would have been more effective (De Grauwe, 
2010b, 2011; De Grauwe and Ji, 2013b). 
                                                 
17 To be sure, in this case the USA is not a good reference point. In fact, as to regulation, it had abundantly 
deregulated financial markets in the Eighties. As for wage policy, apart from a few attempts many decades 
ago, the USA has never adopted such policy. Finally, the USA regional and industrial policies have always been 
very weak too. 
18 Different languages and historical factors explain to a large extent the lower mobility in Europe as 
compared to that in the USA.  
19 Remember the final objectives of the ECB (see sub-section 2.3) as opposed to those of the Federal 
Reserve. 
 In a nutshell, responsibility for the crisis is to a large extent attributable to the 
unsuitable institutions for an area too heterogeneous in terms of economic growth and 
inflation. An area whose only common policy is that of a conservative central bank can 
face shocks of the kind and size that have hit Europe only at the cost of depression. 
The difficulty of facing the crisis in a unified monetary policy having no other common 
policies, notably federal fiscal policy, has been recognized by the then President of the 
ECB himself. In fact, he said: ‘We must remain mindful that the Euro-area consists of 
16 sovereign states. It is not a fully-fledged political union or a fiscal federation, within 
a unified government bond market’ (Trichet, 2010). 
 
 
4. THE HISTORICAL ROOTS OF EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS  
 
As is well known, European institutions after 1957 were little more than a customs 
union. In 1992 the Maastricht accords established the creation of the EMU. In some 
sense this was the prosecution of an old idea dating back to the Werner plan of 1969. 
However, this was amended of all the institutions and macroeconomic policies which 
had been foreseen in that plan. Further decisions established an independent central 
bank having price stability as its pre-eminent target.  
The EMU construction was heavily influenced both by some practical circumstances 
that had matured in the previous two decades and by some developments of economic 
theory since the late sixties
20
.  
From the former point of view notable is the rising weight and bargaining power of 
Germany among European countries (Gros, Thygesen, 1992: chap. 1), due to its rapid 
growth and the unification with Eastern lander. This country was thus able to pursue its 
scarce interests in implementing appropriate policies to close long-run divergences in 
economic performance (Gros, Thygesen, 1992: 318) while having institutions that 
tended primarily to price stability and avoided re-alignments of nominal exchange rates 
by ‘deficit’ countries (particularly in the aftermath of its re-unification). In the more 
indulgent interpretation of the German ‘vision’ underlying the EMU construction, in due 
time a common currency could integrate European economies and make them 
converge: monetary unification could ensure the structural changes necessary for 
creating a stable macroeconomic context (in particular, uniform wage and price 
dynamics). A unique currency ruled by a conservative central bank would impose the 
                                                 
20 See, e.g., Lambertini, Rovelli (2004).  
The pre-dominant theoretical influence was that of optimal currency areas (Mundell, 1961), even if many 
economists had manifested their reserves and critiques (Cesarano, 1997, 2006). The antecedents of the Single 
Act are well represented by Gros and Thygesen (1992). A French and Italian memorandum had criticized the 
European Monetary System bias against ‘deficit’ countries as well absence of mechanisms designed to achieve 
structural change and growth. The German answer was of a monetarist kind, in asking for monetary 
unification and the institution of a central bank capable of acting as “catlysts in the efforts to achieve the 
necessary convergence of economic policies in the member states” (Gros and Thygesen (1992: 313-4). 
German reply, anticipating real developments in the European institutional architecture, is thus closely linked 
to theoretical innovations since the end of the 1960s as well as to the traditional stance of Bundesbank, fully 
accepted by the German government.  
 virtues of automatic rules and external constraints, leading not only to nominal, but 
also to real convergence. From this perspective, the Eurozone has been referred to as 
an updated – even if geographically reduced - version of Gold standard. 
In so far as the evolution of economic thought is concerned, of fundamental 
importance were the ideas of: a long-run vertical Phillips curve
21
; existence of a 
negative correlation between inflation and growth; the need to ensure constraints on 
lax fiscal policies that would have prevented harmful time inconsistency and 
accumulation of public debt
22
, the more so in the presence of coordination between 
national fiscal authorities
23
; the positive impact on inflation and employment of an 
independent and conservative central bank
24
. In this perspective it is not strange that 
until recently
25
 the only common institution in the EMU has been a conservative central 
bank and that the idea of alternative institutions to preside over price stability has been 
given up even if they had produced positive outcomes in some EMU countries 
(Acocella, Leoni, 2007) and a conservative bank is a suboptimal solution in that 
environment (Acocella, Di Bartolomeo, Tirelli, 2007a; 2007b).  
Only a few economists and observers
26
 warned at the time – or have pointed out 
later – about the fragility of this project. The financial crisis that hit Europe was initiated 
by the Greek shock in 2009. However, about 20 years after Maastricht, persistence of 
structural imbalances implies that any adverse shock hitting a peripheral country would 
have led to similar consequences. 
 
 
5. THE ROLE OF THE HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT: THE THEORETICAL INNOVATIONS 
OF THE 1970S AND THEIR RECENT MISE-EN-QUESTION  
 
                                                 
21 See, e.g., European Commission (1990: 22), Goodhart (1994). 
22 Reference is to arguments by Rogoff in favour of a conservative central banker (Rogoff, 1985) as well as 
to political economy ones (see, e.g., Alesina, Tabellini, 1990; Alesina, Perotti, 1995b). These are recalled, e.g., 
by De Haan, Sturm (1992), Cukierman (1994), Akhtar (1995). 
23 In monetary unions time inconsistency justifies a conservative central bank and absence of coordination 
between fiscal policies (Beetsma, Bovenberg, 1998). These conclusions, however, strictly depend on the 
assumption of absence of labour markets distortions (Acocella, Di Bartolomeo and Tirelli, 2007b). More 
specifically, when trade unions operate fiscal coordination ensures better outcomes with a conservative 
central bank, while being detrimental with a populist one (Acocella, Di Bartolomeo and Tirelli, 2007a), which is 
paradoxical with respect to the institutional arrangements of the EMU. 
24 The influence of these ideas should be compared to that of the Keynesian thought on the statute of the 
Fed, though the amendments of the 1970s, which required the Board and the FOMC ‘to promote effectively 
the goals of maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates’ 
25 Common financial regulatory bodies were set in 2009-2010, but are to a large extent still to take off. 
26 See Eichengreen, Frieden (2000). For the practical absence of anti-cyclical policies and the limitation of 
the European budget see Buiter, Corsetti, Roubini (1993). For perverse incentives leading to self-realizing 
speculative attack created by the Treaty see Eichengreen, Wyplosz (1993); on the compromises between 
different positions leading to the Treaty see Bini Smaghi, Padoa Schioppa, Papadia (1994); on the issue of 
coordination between monetary and fiscal policy see also Dixit, Lambertini (2001), Leitemo (2004), Onorante 
(2006). 
 Almost a decade ago Alan Blinder claimed that ‘a sharp revision of the naively 
optimistic views (about the virtues of markets) held by some economists circa 1966 
was called for …(as) the pendulum may have swung just a bit too far.‘ (Blinder, 2004a: 
26).  
These words are even more actual nowadays as economic theory has further 
questioned the credo that had emerged at the end of the 1970s. After thirty years Rip 
van Winkle’s27 faith in the 1970s credo would again be crowded out by the analytical 
developments of the following years. Think of: the limited practical relevance of 
surprise effects, recognized by Lucas (1996: 679) himself; the irrelevance of many 
critiques to the ‘classical’ theory of economic policy (in particular, Tinbergen’s ‘golden 
rule’ about controlling the economy) based on rational expectations (Blinder, 1998: 8; 
Acocella, Di Bartolomeo, Hughes Hallett, 2012
28
); the theoretical and practical limits to 
time inconsistency and thus to related prescriptions of monetary policy rules that 
should replace discretionary action (Blinder, 1998: 56); existence of a long-run non 
vertical Phillips curve (Graham and Snower, 2008; Benigno and Ricci, 2011; Acocella, 
Di Bartolomeo, Tirelli, 2013); the need for more active fiscal policy and regulation 
(especially of financial markets and institutions
29
) once some unrealistic assumptions 
of current models are ruled out
30
; critique of the arguments put forward by Rogoff 
(1985) and Bade and Parkin (1978) according to which a conservative central bank 
can reduce inflation and its political independence lowers inflation by disciplining public 
spending decisions, with no negative impact on unemployment and growth (see 
Posen, 1994, and Hayo, 1998, who highlight that both political independence and 
inflation are the outcome of structural economic and social factors that make the 
central bank statutes have no impact on inflation); critique of the Friedman rule and the 
need for an inflation target well above zero (Tirelli, Di Bartolomeo, Acocella, 2010).  
Of special interest are two myths of the literature that have inspired the European 
construction first and its policy to combat the crisis: the idea of a limit beyond which an 
increase in public debt would have negative consequences on growth (Reinhart and 
Rogoff, 2010; Kumar and Woo, 2010); the assertion of very low spending and tax 
                                                 
27 Rip van Winkle is the character created by Washington Irvin and evoked by Gordon (1976) who made a 
terrible ‘environmental’ mistake awaking up in the republican America after sleeping for twenty-years by 
declaring himself a devote subject of King George III.  
28 Public action can be facilitated by rational expectations. In what circumstances this can happen depends 
on the number of targets and that of the instruments available to the government and the private sector 
(Acocella, Di Bartolomeo and Hughes Hallett, 2012). When the policymaker has a sufficient number of 
instruments available he can make use of appropriate announcements of future policies (to exercise what the 
Federal Reserve calls “forward guidance” (Woodford, 2007, 2008; and Williams, 2011).  
29 Europe and the USA have slowly moved to introduce tough regulation in this field. Remarkable is the new 
position of the IMF, which now advocates exceptional and limited direct controls of capital movements, 
reversing the pro free market position adopted in the previous 40 years (IMF, 2012). 
30 In a few lines we will deal with the introduction of assumptions that moderate intertemporal 
consumption smoothing and limit effectiveness of fiscal policy. As to the possible negative impact on real 
activity of imperfections in financial markets, see Bernanke and Gertler (1989, 1990); Greenwald and Stiglitz 
(1988, 1990, 1993), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997, 2002); Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) and a lot more 
recent contributions. 
 multipliers. The former has recently been demolished almost by chance as a 
consequence of a Ph.D. investigation. The latter has passed through a long process of 
both theoretical refinements and empirical evaluations. 
The policy prescriptions deriving from neoclassical and New Keynesian theories 
incorporating some sort of Barro-Ricardo effect tend to suggest the virtues of fiscal 
contraction, insisting on its positive effects on both the demand- and supply-side as 
well as its long term benefits (Hebous, 2010), especially if one adds the negative long 
term impact of debt on growth already cited.  
However, even in these neoclassical and New Keynesian models separable utility, 
deep habits consumption, rule-of-thumb consumers, spending reversals could restore 
even significantly positive Keynesian-like effects of public spending increases on 
output (Hebous, 2010).  
Of specific interest for us are theoretical models of open economies. In this context, 
the impact of budget policies on the real exchange rate plays an important role in 
determining the size of the multiplier effect. Under certain circumstances the real 
exchange rate can depreciate. The possibility of this outcome is investigated by: 
Frankel and Razin (1987), who assume tax financing of public expenditures and an 
exogenous supply of money; Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995), who consider circumstances 
leading to a interest rates reduction, namely short-run price rigidities and consumption 
smoothing; Corsetti, Meier and Muller (2009), who point to expectations of a 
systematic reduction over time of future government spending that precludes a real 
interest rate rise. Also other effects must be taken into account in an open economy, 
such as existence of incomplete international financial markets (Kollman, 2009) and 
the possibility of a home bias in consumption (Ravn et al., 2007): both increase the 
impact of public expenditure expansion. In an open-economy context also positive 
spillover effects have a special interest. They operate via trade. Beetsma et al. (2006, 
2009, 2011) explore the international spillovers from fiscal policy shocks in Europe. A 
fiscal expansion stimulates domestic activity, which leads to more foreign exports and, 
hence, higher foreign output. Erceg, Gust and Lopez Salido (2007) and Spilimbergo et 
al. (2008) argue that fiscal coordination increases multiplier effects. 
Interactions between fiscal and monetary policymakers have an impact on the nature 
and the value of spillovers and fiscal multipliers. In a monetary union such as EMU 
assigning monetary authorities the primary target of price stability implies a further 
negative spillover: in fact, any expansionary fiscal action by one country has an impact 
on the union’s price level and thus calls for deflationary intervention by the ECB. 
Beetsma and Bovenberg (1998), Beetsma and Uhlig (1999), Beetsma et al. (2001 
a,b,c) and Michalak et al. (2009), while using different modelling approaches,
31
 all find 
negative effects on income from fully-coordinated fiscal expansion, due to the reaction 
of the central bank to inflationary policies. A partially-coordinated fiscal stimulus is less 
harmful. As said before, Acocella et al. (2007) criticizes this approach, as it does not 
consider the conduct of strategic trade unions, which could be moderated by fiscal 
coordination and a conservative central bank. However, the prevailing view is that 
                                                 
31 Michalak et al. (2009) use a New Keynesian model in continuous time, whereas the others do not use 
micro-founded models. 
 negative spillovers are the pre-dominant kind of spillovers in the EMU (see, more 
extensively, Beetsma, 2008 and Beetsma and Giuliodori, 2010). The only problem is 
then whether existence of a committed central bank can avoid the negative effects on 
price stability of free-riding by national fiscal authorities (as asserted by Chari and 
Kehoe, 2007) or if other institutions are needed to complement the type of central bank 
that has been chosen for the union (a pact of the kind of the SGP, as claimed by 
Beetsma and Uhlig, 1999, in order to reduce negative spillovers arising from political 
distortions, which can be exacerbated in a monetary union).
32
  
Apart from these analyses, which did not have an influence on the prevailing views 
of analysts and policymakers until a few years ago, the idea was diffuse of very low 
fiscal multipliers. On the one hand this implied ineffectiveness of Keynesian policies. 
On the other, considering also the negative long term effect of debt, fiscal 
consolidation was needed and either a reduction in expenditures or a rise in taxes 
would have been effective without doing short-run negative effects if the income 
multiplier of each is less than one. If this is the case, in fact, the numerator of the 
deficit (and also of the debt) to GDP ratio will diminish more than the denominator also 
in the short run. Since in many cases empirical research has found such values of the 
multipliers, it may appear natural that some authors have concluded that fiscal 
consolidation requires expenditure cuts and/or tax increases. Obviously enough, the 
value of multipliers is strictly dependent on the time of reference of the effects.  
Some empirical research on consolidation policies has led to an assertion of the 
effectiveness of government expenditures cuts, rather than tax hikes, also from a short 
run perspective. Exit strategies for fiscal imbalances based on public spending 
reduction, in addition to, or more than, tax increases have thus been advocated. The fil 
rouge in urging such strategies is in the analysis of Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) – who 
explain the positive effects on consumption of the cuts of the 1980s in the Danish and 
Irish public expenditure as deriving from households’ expectations of permanent cuts 
in the level of government budget – and the following findings, along similar lines, of 
Alesina and Perotti (1995a, 97), Giavazzi and Pagano (1996), Barro and Redlick 
(2009), Alesina and Ardagna (1998, 2010), Broadbent and Daly (2010). 
We can call this ‘fin de siécle’ credo of the possibility of expansionary fiscal 
consolidation the new conventional wisdom among economists that has inspired a 
number of policy attitudes and interventions in the last decade or so. In some countries 
(as in Japan in the first half of the 1990s and in the major industrialized countries at the 
beginning of the current crisis) Keynesian policies were adopted, but more recent 
interventions in these countries, notably in Europe, seem to follow the ‘conventional 
wisdom’. 33  
Doubts with respect to some tenets of this conventional wisdom are raised in 
Blanchard and Perotti (2002), which give a substantially Keynesian answer to the 
issue of the effects of tax and expenditure increases on income: from the point of view 
                                                 
32 This issue is reviewed at length in Beetsma and Giuliodori (2010: section 7). 
33 According to Kuttner and Posen (2001, p. 128), quoted by Fontana (2009) the idea of expansionary fiscal 
contractions was also invoked – with negative consequences – in Japan in late 1996 to legislate a large 
increase in value added taxes.  
 of their effects on income, the former have a contractionary effect, while the latter have 
an expansionary one. Blanchard and Perotti (2002) do not engage in a discussion 
about debt consolidation strategies, but one could hardly assert that a policy of 
expenditure reductions and (to a less extent) of tax increases, while certainly 
contributing to the reduction of the numerator of the debt/GDP ratio, would give an 
impulse to the denominator. From this point of view we would say that their findings 
support a Keynesian-type attitude of debt consolidation not based on a budget 
contraction, at least in so far as the effects on income are concerned. 
Of specific relevance are some analyses that take account of open economies (in 
some cases the EMU) and spillover effects. In order to quantify these effects Coenen 
and Wieland (2002) construct a small macroeconometric model of the USA, the Euro 
area and Japan and find that international spillovers of domestic shocks turn out to be 
rather small when exchange rates are flexible and short-term interest rates are set 
according to policy rules that focus on stabilizing domestic variables. By contrast, 
Beetsma et al. (2006) combine a panel VAR model in government spending, net taxes 
and GDP with a panel trade model. They find that a public spending increase (tax 
reduction) equal to 1% of GDP implies 2.3% (0.6%) more foreign exports over the first 
two years, on average. If Germany initiates such budget change, the effect on the 
GDP of trading partners is 0.23% (0.06%) over the first two years. These figures are 
likely to indicate lower bounds for the effects that will actually occur (Beetsma et al., 
2006). Beetsma et al. (2008) find that a 1% of GDP public spending impulse produces 
a 1.2% output rise on impact and a 1.6% peak response of output. In addition, rising 
imports and falling exports together produce an impact fall of the trade balance of 
0.5% of GDP and a peak fall of 0.8% of GDP. The public budget moves into a deficit of 
0.7% of GDP on impact. Similar results are in Beetsma and Giuliodori’s (2011)34 
estimation of the effects of government purchases in open European economies, 
which are consistent with the neo-Keynesian framework. This strengthens the rationale 
behind a concerted fiscal expansion envisaged among European countries and, by 
contrast, implies that decentralized, but in the same direction, decisions to introduce 
fiscal discipline have cumulative negative effects that may impair reaching the target of 
a reduction in the debt/GDP ratio.  
A more complete and detailed empirical analysis of the effects of fiscal consolidation 
is in IMF (2010)
35
, which takes into account a number of aspects of the effects of fiscal 
consolidation policies: in particular, their timing (i.e., whether they are short- or long-
term), the monetary policy stance, the expansionary or contractionary nature of budget 
policies of other countries. Its conclusion is that, first, ‘the idea that fiscal austerity 
triggers faster growth in the short term finds little support in the data. Fiscal 
retrenchment typically has contractionary short-term effects on economic activity, with 
lower output and higher unemployment…, (but) fiscal consolidation is likely to be 
                                                 
34 Beetsma and Giuliodori’s (2011) offer a good review of the results of existing empirical tests. 
35 A previous review of the literature on empirical effects of fiscal policy had been conducted by Hemming 
et al. (2002). The general conclusion of this review was that the impact on output of a fiscal stimulus was 
generally positive, albeit a small one in some cases, depending on a number of circumstance variable from 
country to country and even from one episode to another. 
 beneficial over the long term’. In addition, a budget cut is less expansionary the lower 
the interest rate (as monetary policy has little room for partially accommodating their 
deflationary effects), the lower the possibility of a currency depreciation and the less 
expansionary are the policies of other countries, which gives little scope for raising net 
export. 
 
 
6. WHY EUROPEAN POLICYMAKERS ARE STILL SLAVES OF ECONOMIC THEORIES 
FASHIONABLE IN THE SEVENTIES? PHYSIOLOGICAL LAGS AND PERVERSE TIES.  
 
After more than twenty years of implementation of dated theories and its certainly not 
superb outcomes, it seems difficult to begin re-thinking of policies in Europe. 
Differently from the United States, neither theoretical progress of the Ninenties and the 
following decade nor the depth of the crisis that has hit the EMU countries have 
produced a substantial change in the institutional architecture of EMU and current 
policy attitudes. The former has even stressed its deflationary bias by introducing the 
‘fiscal compact’. 36   
Policy actions always depend on both economic theory and practical political 
orientations and interests. The latter partly reflect the former, but are to some extent 
independent of them, and there are a number of factors explaining this diversity (see, 
e.g., Galbraith, 1987).  
Among the latter we would like to underline the still opposing interests of different 
EMU countries, at least according to the views prevailing in political circles. Germany 
and some other countries have created a system powerful enough not to suffer from 
the deflationary bias of the EMU institutions, because of their ability to successfully 
compete in Europe (and to some extent outside the area). By contrast, peripheral 
countries (most of the PIIGS) still think that they may draw profit from the external 
constrain of fixed exchange rates and other EMU institutions. They might like changing 
these institutions but are not powerful enough to counter German opposition. 
Fragmentation between the different European countries is rising.  
However, the economic evolution and the depth of the crisis seem to have an 
influence on political attitudes. The level of unemployment is still climbing everywhere 
in Europe. France, the Netherlands and other formerly virtuous countries are facing 
rather serious difficulties that have led also to a deterioration of the deficit/GDP ratio. A 
very dangerous situation is thus emerging that might be a prelude to a vast 
authoritarian attitude throughout Europe. This might help explain why Germany could 
accept some attenuation of its tough stance. Then positions are slowly changing. 
 
 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
 
                                                 
36 From this point of view Rip van Winkle would certainly not be hit by the institutional changes introduced 
in the EMU. He could still declare himself a convinced supporter of the theories asserted by Friedman, Sargent 
and Wallace, Barro or Lucas, without repeating an ‘environmental’ mistake. 
 The evolution of economic thought can contribute to explain differences only in so far 
as EMU institutions were built at a time when the state of economic analysis seemed 
to justify them. Time has passed which should have led to a radical change of most of 
the still current institutional architecture, but a sort of hysteresis is in place. This has a 
number of possible explanations, as those underlined by Galbraith (1987). However, in 
order to explain it one should refer not only to normal and physiological lags, but also 
the opposing interests and visions among European countries and the dominant role of 
Germany. 
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